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In a recent conversation with a number of male law professors, one of them 
said: “I don’t teach rape because it’s just too difficult.” I immediately wondered 
what precisely was “too difficult” about it. Then I recalled how rape law was 
taught when I took a criminal law course at U.C. Berkeley in 2005. For every 
other subject covered in that course, the male professor combined lecture and 
the Socratic Method to get about 90 students to discover the underlying logic 
of criminal law. When we got to the rape law section, however, the class was 
broken into small groups. We met in these groups for several class periods. 
Second- and third-year law students, serving as teaching assistants, guided us 
in discussing rape and the law. 
These two instances suggest that instructors of criminal law, perhaps 
particularly male professors, have anxiety about teaching the law of rape. 
Indeed, as I began to research the pedagogy of rape law, I discovered that 
this anxiety is relatively common and that, in response, some instructors either 
do not teach rape law in their courses or they teach it, as my own professor 
did, in a manner entirely different from the way they teach other criminal law 
subjects.1
Despite the modest success of efforts in the 1980s to get rape included in 
the criminal law curriculum and while all major casebooks on the subject now 
include sections on rape, many instructors intentionally skip the topic. At first 
this may seem to be a trivial observation and one that can be easily explained 
by the fact that rape is an emotional and heavily charged topic. The limited 
scholarship on the pedagogy of rape law, however, outlines other reasons for 
not teaching rape law. 
Some instructors say they do not teach rape because they do not cover 
substantive crimes—except for homicide—in their criminal law courses. 
James Tomkovicz, who relates his experience of teaching rape law for the 
first time in a 1992 law review article, mentions many reasons for avoiding 
the topic, including the risk it presents to the educational atmosphere. For 
instance, students who have been victims of sexual assault may find it difficult 
and traumatic to participate in or hear a discussion of rape law. For years, 
1. Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 Yale J.l. & Feminism 307 (1995).
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Tomkovicz did not cover rape in his criminal law course and his justification for 
not teaching the topic was that he had too much else to cover. After teaching it 
for the first time, however, he realized its pedagogic value and acknowledged 
that one of the reasons he had not taught it in the past was that he resented 
being told by an “interest group” what he should include in his course.2
Although there are a variety of reasons for not teaching rape law, many 
of them focus on the emotional and personal aspects of rape. A persistent 
worry is that the issue of rape is too volatile for the law school classroom. 
Tomkovicz offers this tentative explanation for the perceived volatility of rape 
law discussions: 
Discussion of the subject will evoke strong, sometimes irrational, often 
intemperate reactions. I do not claim to know the reasons for this phenomenon. 
Perhaps it is that the vast majority of sexual assaults involve the victimization 
of women by men. Perhaps it is that rape remains a prevalent and critical 
problem in our society. Perhaps it is the perception that the predominantly 
male shapers of our law have moved all-too-reluctantly to eliminate harmful 
stereotypes of women and unfair advantages for men. Perhaps it is that many 
women, their relatives, and their friends have been injured, or that many men 
see themselves as potential targets of unfair criticism and unfounded serious 
charges. Perhaps it is a general unwillingness to be open-minded about 
controversial and emotional topics. More likely, it is some combination of 
all of these variables and more that guarantees a discussion of rape will be 
fraught with the potential for turmoil.3 
While many aspects of this assessment likely are accurate, I think there is more 
to the volatility of rape discussions and thus to the issue of how and whether 
rape law is taught in a law school classroom.
In this article I consider some potential roots of the anxiety surrounding the 
teaching of rape law and its actual or perceived explosiveness. In particular, I 
argue that the crime of rape implicates issues of identity, gender and emotion. 
I explore how the politics of identity figures in the emotional intensity of 
rape and in the anxiety around teaching rape law. I argue that the identity 
politics framework and its epistemology would stifle classroom discussion and 
reinforce problematic understandings of female and male identity. Although I 
am critical of the politics of identity, I also argue that it challenges in important 
ways many deep-seated assumptions about law, reason and objectivity and 
is thus especially threatening to those law professors who take these things 
for granted. Emphasizing that rape is too difficult to teach because it is an 
emotional topic may mask the deeper ways in which a discussion of rape—
particularly an analysis that views it as oppressive of women thus giving them 
special standing to analyze it—challenges ideas law professors take for granted, 
such as their own authority, rationality and objectivity. Moreover, it is in part 
emotion itself that grounds this challenge. 
2. James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and Rewards, 102 Yale l.J. 481, 483 (1992).
3. Id. at 505.
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I thus explore the pedagogy of rape law through a framework that looks 
critically at the questions of knowledge, emotion and authority that are 
implicated in both identity politics and traditional ways of thinking about 
the law. Many scholars have examined the relationships among law, identity 
and emotion4 and some critical attention has been paid to the way in which 
identity and emotion play out in legal pedagogy.5 No one, however, has 
examined critically how identity and emotion affect the pedagogy of rape law. 
By critically analyzing instructors’ reluctance to teach rape law, this article fills 
that gap. In doing so, I use the pedagogy of rape law to illuminate broader 
issues of gender, identity and emotion as related to rape and the law. 
The Politics of Identity
Not long after the conversation in which the law professor mentioned that 
he does not cover rape in his criminal law course, a female colleague described 
to me her reactions when she heard that a man was writing a scholarly piece 
about rape. She acknowledged that she had had a knee-jerk reaction and 
questioned his standing to speak with expertise on the subject. Underlying 
her reaction was the idea that one must have a certain relationship to and 
particular experiences of rape to be able to speak authentically and with 
authority about it. Furthermore, she was assuming that only women have the 
requisite experience of rape. The possibility and even likelihood that students 
will have similar attitudes may be one reason that instructors are reluctant to 
teach rape law. 
My colleague’s reaction can be understood as a manifestation of what 
has come to be known as identity politics. Although the term is often used 
imprecisely to refer to a variety of ideas, aspects of identity politics capture 
something important about this reaction. In this analysis of the pedagogy of 
rape law, I am employing “the politics of identity” to refer to the idea that, 
because of shared experiences, only members of a historically subordinated 
4. For an overview of the emerging field of law and the emotions, see Terry A. Maroney, Law 
and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 law & Hum. BeHav. 119 (2006). For an 
overview of the relation between legal feminism, identity, and the emotions, see Kathryn 
Abrams, Legal Feminism and the Emotions: Three Moments in an Evolving Relationship, 28 Harv. J.l. 
& Gender 325 (2005). See also Kathryn Abrams, The Progress of Passion, 100 micH. l. rev. 1602 
(2002); Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 cardozo l. rev. 37 
(1988). For a critique of identity-based legal claims, see wendY Brown, states oF inJurY: 
Power and Freedom in late modernitY (1995).
5. Scholarship on law school and identity includes: Kimberle Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-
Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 4 s. cal. rev. l. & women’s stud. 33 (1994); Judith 
G. Greenberg, Erasing Race from Legal Education, 28 u. micH. J.l. reForm 51 (1994); Lani 
Guinier, Michelle Fine & Jane Balin, Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League 
Law School, 143 u. Pa. l. rev. 1 (1994); Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not 
Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 BerkeleY women’s l.J. 1 (1989); Catherine 
Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 stan. l. rev. 1299 (1988). 
Banu Ramachandran provides a critique of the latter three articles in Re-Reading Difference: 
Feminist Critiques of the Law School Classroom and the Problem with Speaking from Experience, 98 colum. 
l. rev. 1757 (1998).
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group are thought to have the authority to speak about and analyze practices 
that are understood as central to their oppression. This perspective is itself a 
reaction to the persistent privileging of the perspectives of those in power and 
the tendency for those perspectives to be presented as objective reality.6 As 
bell hooks puts is: “Identity politics emerges out of the struggles of oppressed 
or exploited groups to have a standpoint on which to critique dominant 
structures, a position that gives purpose and meaning to struggle.”7 
Experience and how it is interpreted play an important role in identity 
politics. My colleague’s identity-based reaction to a man’s analysis of rape is 
a manifestation of the perspective that, as Joan Scott puts it, takes experience 
as “an originary point of explanation—as a foundation upon which analysis is 
based.”8 In this case, the experience of being rapable and of being oppressed 
through rape, even if one is never actually raped, is understood as providing 
a necessary ground for analysis. This understanding takes experience to be 
the foundation of analysis rather than that which is itself open to analysis. 
It thus consolidates and “takes as self-evident the identities of those whose 
experience is being documented and thus naturalizes their difference.”9 
Experiences are seen to flow from the incontrovertible fact of identity rather 
than, as Scott thinks we should see them, as part of the way in which difference 
is established. In other words, taking experience as unquestionable, as the 
ground of identity, naturalizes differences and categories like that of woman. 
Politically, this phenomenon manifests itself as the uncritical acceptance of 
the subject’s identity and experiences as the ground from which the subject 
speaks and as the basis of political recognition. Both experience and identity 
are understood as foundational and natural. 
In the context of rape, identity politics’ uncritical appeal to identity and 
experience manifests as a skepticism of male analyses of rape. The postulated 
absence of the experience of being raped or of being rapable positions a man 
as per se unable to speak about rape. Moreover, if rape is understood as a 
means of oppressing women, men are excluded from having the experience 
of being oppressed through rape. While I agree with the analysis of rape that 
views it as a tool of oppression, when combined with an uncritical appeal to 
experience, rape’s status as a tool of oppression may be taken for granted. 
In the process, female identity itself becomes bound to rapability. Since only 
those who are presumed to have been oppressed by rape—that is, women—
6. For a number of other uses of identity politics, see Susan Bickford, Anti-Anti-Identity Politics: 
Feminism, Democracy, and the Complexities of Citizenship, 12 HYPatia 111 (1997). For an account of 
identity politics, see sonia kruks, retrievinG exPerience: suBJectivitY and recoGnition 
in Feminist Politics 80-83 (2001).
7. Bell Hooks, teacHinG to transGress: education as tHe Practice oF Freedom 88-89 
(1994).
8. Joan W. Scott, The Evidence of Experience, 17 critical inquirY 773, 777 (1991).
9. Joan W. Scott, Experience, in Feminists tHeorize tHe Political 22, 24-25 (Judith Butler & 
Joan W. Scott eds., 1992).
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are given standing to speak authoritatively about it, the connection between 
rapability and female identity is solidified. 
Simultaneously, male identity becomes bound to the potential to rape 
and men’s presumptive status as perpetrators is reinforced. Thus, taking 
experience and identity as foundational sets up and perpetuates a binary 
understanding of men as powerful rapists and women as relatively powerless 
potential victims. This dichotomous understanding is reflected in Tomkovicz’s 
discussion of teaching rape in a criminal law course for the first time when he 
notes: “All women are potential victims. All men are potential defendants.”10 
Crucially, the naturalization of difference that occurs in an analysis of rape 
that takes identity for granted reinforces both the link between women and 
rapability and the link between masculinity and the capacity to rape. This 
characterization challenges neither women’s violability nor the culture of rape 
and sexual assault. 
Although examining the way in which rape operates as an instrument 
of power and oppression is important, identity politics risks binding 
the experience of subordination to female identity. As political theorist 
Wendy Brown has argued, injury has become constitutive of identity for 
marginalized groups. In fact, to the extent political recognition comes to rest 
on a subordinated identity, subjects become invested in their own injury. As 
Brown writes: “Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for 
itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing and inscribing its pain in 
politics; it can hold out no future—for itself or others—that triumphs over 
this pain.”11 On this understanding, identity becomes rooted in injury such 
that when identity is naturalized and reinscribed, injury is as well. Injury 
itself becomes foundational. Brown argues that “wounded attachments” have 
formed “the basis for ungrounded persistence in ontological essentialism and 
epistemological foundationalism, for infelicitous formulations of identity 
rooted in injury.”12 
Rape brings up, viscerally for some, what is understood as the injury of 
womanhood. Indeed, rape is commonly viewed as the worst thing that 
could happen to a woman and thus as the most severe mark of the injury of 
womanhood. This intense identification with violability may stem in part from 
the tendency of legal authorities not to take rape accusations seriously and to 
put victims on trial,13 as well as other discriminatory practices such as historic 
laws that rendered black women unrapable.14 Nonetheless, the identification 
10. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 498.
11. Brown, supra note 4, at 74.
12. Id. at xii.
13. For a discussion of rape victims being put on trial, see susan estricH, real raPe (1988); 
Jeanne c. marsH, alison Geist & natHan s. caPlan, raPe and tHe limits oF law 
reForm (1982); and Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 
colum. l. rev. 1 (1977).
14. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 stan. l. rev. 581, 599-601 
21The Pedagogy of Rape Law
of violability with womanhood has negative effects. When combined with a 
politics that assumes identity as a ground of analysis and not as something 
open to analysis, rape appears inevitable and foundational to womanhood. 
While rape has rightfully been analyzed for its role in the oppression of women, 
taking rape as foundational to women’s experience and identity is at odds with 
an approach that challenges women’s presumed violability and powerlessness. 
Considering the historical and ongoing differences of women’s experience 
of rape complicates understandings of the relationships among gender, 
identity and rape. As mentioned above, black women were historically not 
seen as violable. And, as bell hooks notes, slave women were often blamed 
for their own rape and white women were complicit in the sexual assault of 
black women.15 While black women have been viewed as unrapable, black men 
have been seen as presumptive rapists of white women. Analyzing rape from 
an intersectional perspective reveals varied experiences and interpretations of 
it.16 It thereby also adds another element to the politics of identity as they may 
play out in the law school classroom. Racial as well as gendered tensions are 
likely to arise.17 
These views of identity, experience and injury provide insight into why 
criminal law instructors, especially male ones, would be hesitant to teach rape 
law. The instructor’s position as the authority figure in a classroom would 
necessarily be challenged when discussing rape since, from an identity politics 
viewpoint he would be understood as lacking access to the truth of the matter. 
He would presumably lack the necessary experience, injury and identity to 
speak about rape. Even a female law professor may be hesitant to teach rape 
law since her identity may be viewed as predetermining her analysis and thus 
as lacking objectivity, especially if she is a member of other marginal groups. 
Additionally, should her analysis depart from the views she is presumed to 
hold, she may be vilified, since identity politics sometimes manifests as an 
assumption that one’s membership in a group and the group members’ shared 
experiences demand a given analysis and political outlook.18
(1990). For a detailed historical account of the intersection of gender and race in colonial 
Virginia, see katHleen Brown, Good wives, nastY wencHes, and anxious PatriarcHs: 
Gender, race, and Power in colonial virGinia (1996).
15. Bell Hooks, ain’t i a woman: Black women and Feminism 51-59 (1981).
16. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 139 u. cHi. leGal F. 139 (1989).
17. Patricia Williams, for example, examined law school exams and found, among other things 
“criminal-law exams whose questions feature exclusively Hispanic or Asian criminals and 
exclusively white victims” as well as “many, many questions in which women are beaten, 
raped and killed in descriptions pornographically detailed (in contrast to streamlined 
questions, by the same professors, that do not involve female victims).” Patricia williams, 
tHe alcHemY oF race and riGHts: diarY oF a law ProFessor 85 (1992).
18. This identification with injury also may ground the idea that there is one reality of rape and 
that, if a woman articulates something that does not closely align with what she is supposed 
to think, she is demonized. For example, one of Tomkovicz’s students was castigated 
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The politics of identity also reveals how debate and analysis of rape law 
in the classroom might be stifled. The assumptions that only those who are 
oppressed by rape should speak about it would hinder classroom discussion. 
The belief that there is one legitimate analysis of rape, which is the analysis 
grounded in a position of subordination would also stifle discussion.19 
Moreover, the binary understandings of men and women vis-a-vis rape, as well 
as the idea that experience is foundational, would be reinforced. 
Nonetheless, identity politics and the essentialism that may accompany it 
need to be understood within the larger framework of who is given authority 
to speak. As bell hooks explains: 
. . . systems of domination already at work in the academy and the classroom 
silence the voices of individuals from marginalized groups and give space only 
when on the basis of experience it is demanded . . . . [W]hen [marginalized] 
groups do employ essentialism as a way to dominate in institutional settings, 
they are often imitating paradigms for asserting subjectivity that are part of 
the controlling apparatus in structures of domination.20
Asserting the authority of voice, as hooks calls it, can thus be understood as “a 
strategic response to domination and to colonization, a survival strategy that 
may indeed inhibit discussion even as it rescues students from negation.”21 
As noted above, the identity politics framework would deny a man’s analysis 
of rape any legitimacy because victims or potential victims are thought to have 
the only legitimate perspectives. This can be understood sympathetically as a 
response to the historic denial of women’s perspectives and experiences of rape. 
However, it is also important to consider that one of the central legal dilemmas 
of rape is precisely the issue of whose perspective matters most. What of the 
situation when the defendant in a rape trial claims not to have understood 
the actions of the victim as a real protestation? To deny the defendant any 
legitimate basis for speaking from his experience is to preclude an analysis 
of that perspective and, crucially, an analysis of gendered differences of 
experiences of sexual encounters. To deny men any authority from which to 
speak, because they are presumptively excluded from the category of potential 
victim, is to reify sex difference on the topic of rape and thereby to preclude 
analysis of how those differences are constituted. Again, as Scott writes on the 
view that experience is the foundation of analysis, “evidence of experience 
by her fellow students for arguing in class that there may be some reason for separating 
acquaintance rape from stranger rape. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 495.
19. Scott elaborates on identity and experience by noting, “all those not of the group are denied 
even intellectual access to it, and those within the group whose experiences or interpretations 
do not conform to the established terms of identity must either suppress their views or drop 
out. An appeal to ‘experience’ of this kind forecloses discussion and criticism and turns 
politics into a policing operation.” Joan W. Scott, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity, 61 
octoBer 12, 18 (1992).
20. Hooks, supra note 7, at 81.
21. Id. at 83.
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becomes evidence for the fact of difference rather than a way of exploring how 
difference is established, how it operates, how and in what ways it constitutes 
subjects who see and act in the world.”22 
To curb the frequency of rape this difference is precisely what needs to be 
confronted. Examining how this difference is established through practice is 
crucial. In other words, if difference is established in part through experience 
all experience must be examined critically. Only in this way can gendered 
and racial differences of opinion about what constitutes non-consensual sex 
be brought into alignment. To be sure, it will take a skilled teacher both to 
acknowledge the value in hearing from a variety of perspectives and to critique 
those rooted in patriarchal or racist assumptions. This would be unlikely and 
the classroom would be volatile if the instructor shared those assumptions. 
The view that only women have the requisite experience and thus 
authority to speak about rape not only closes off analysis of experience, it also 
obscures the prevalence of the rape of men. Male rape is already stigmatized 
and underreported, in part because of its associations with feminization 
and homosexuality. Although there often is shame in female rape, it is not 
stigmatized and silenced in the same way male rape is. This is both because 
women are more likely to be targets of sexual assault and because sexual 
objectification and the possibility of sexual assault is bound to female identity. 
The view that denies men any legitimate basis for speaking about rape 
contributes to and reinforces the silence surrounding male victims of rape. 
To the extent the identity politics framework takes hold in the law school 
classroom, future attorneys will not grapple with the question of how the law 
and legal services could better redress the rape of men. In fact, future attorneys 
may continue to think that men are not raped. 
Objectivity and Emotion
One reason instructors cite for not teaching rape in criminal law courses is 
that they perceive rape to be an extremely emotional and sensitive issue.23 The 
sensitivity of the issue is further compounded by the fact that it is likely there 
will be at least one victim or perpetrator of rape in the classroom.24 Although 
the emotion aroused in a discussion of rape may be deeply personal, rape 
is an emotional topic precisely because it is not just an individual crime but 
22. Scott, supra note 9, at 25.
23. Michelle Madden Dempsey, Teaching Rape: Some Reflections on Pedagogy, ssrn eliBrarY, May 
6, 2008, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1601490; Bloch, supra note 1; 
Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 Yale l.J. 509 (1992); Tomkovicz, supra note 2. 
24. Susan Estrich dismisses the concern that rape should not be taught because of the likely 
presence of victims in the class: “No one would ever suggest that we should skip homicide 
in those years when we have students who have been touched by it, or skip insanity because 
some of our students have fought mental illness, or never mention drunk driving because 
we’re all probably too familiar with that. Why should rape be different? Besides, I think the 
majority would find it even more painful to learn nothing about rape in law school.” Estrich, 
supra note 23, at 514.
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also an instrument of oppression. That is, rape is particularly emotionally 
charged to the extent it is understood as a crime of power, the effect of which 
is to subordinate women. Since it is that very subordination that serves as 
the foundation of identity politics, the emotion associated with rape is itself 
intertwined with the politics of identity. 
The emotional intensity of rape initially may seem like a legitimate reason 
for not discussing it. Yet, probing further into the emotions associated with 
rape—in particular, the gendered character of that emotion—and the relation 
between emotion and the law reveals that the anxiety surrounding teaching 
rape law ultimately may be rooted in problematic understandings of emotion 
and objectivity. Additionally, while instructors of any subject may want to 
avoid intense emotional discussion in the classroom, law professors are often 
especially ill-equipped to deal with emotions and especially challenged by 
them because emotions are commonly understood as diametrically opposed 
to the reason and objectivity that are presumed to be the substance and 
object of law. The legal profession confers expertise on those who achieve 
dispassionate distance from a case. The threat of subjectivity and emotion in 
the law school classroom is thus particularly worrisome to instructors, who are 
seen as paragons of rationality and expert distance. 
In fact, on a forum about teaching rape law in criminal law courses an 
anonymous instructor wrote: 
Rape is a difficult subject to teach, and discuss, well. I think many people 
are unable to learn about it in an intelligent fashion. In my experience, 
even people who discuss or advocate regarding rape issues (and who are 
theoretically capable of having an objective discussion) are frequently unable 
to do so. One of the most important lessons we learn in law school is the 
ability to “step back” from the facts of the case and analyze/discuss the LAW. 
Rape is probably one of the, if not the, most difficult subjects in that respect.25 
The author then advised: “Any professor who cannot remain objective 
during the discussion should probably avoid rape.”26 Similarly, Professor 
Daniel J. Solove wrote on the same forum: “I’m not sure whether the fact 
that ‘rape touches close to home’ forces students to focus on the issues. I 
think it could possibly be a distraction.”27 As quoted previously, Tomkovicz 
writes: “Discussion of [rape] will evoke strong, sometimes irrational, often 
intemperate reactions.”28
25. Sailorman, Comment to Jennifer Collins, Teaching Rape in a Criminal Law Class, concurrinG 
oPinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/11/teaching_rape_i.html 
(November 16, 2006, 10:47).
26. Id.
27. Daniel J. Solove, Comment to Jennifer Collins, Teaching Rape in a Criminal Law Class, 
concurrinG oPinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/11/teaching_
rape_i.html (November 5, 2006, 22:19).
28. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 505.
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These quotations demonstrate the persistence within the legal profession of 
the dichotomy between reason and emotion. As is common in legal reasoning, 
these instructors express the view that objectivity is acquired through distance. 
Being too entangled, too personally invested or too emotional distracts from 
objectivity. Put in other words, the idea behind these perspectives on rape 
is that being personally affected and having a personal investment in an 
issue detracts from the ability to think rationally and with objectivity. These 
quotations resonate with what Catharine MacKinnon has argued about 
epistemology. She observes that “the basic epistemic question” of law and 
science has been taken “as a problem of the relation between knowledge—
where knowledge is defined as a replication or reflection or copy of reality—
and objective reality, defined as that world which exists independent of any 
knower or vantage point, independent of knowledge or the process of coming 
to know, and, in principle, knowable in full.”29
This distanced view of objectivity is in tension with identity politics. In fact, 
this is precisely the kind of understanding of objectivity and reason that the 
identity politics framework challenges. As discussed in the previous section, 
identity politics seeks to challenge dominant notions of objectivity and reality. 
That is, identity politics challenges dominant understandings of epistemology 
that assume there is a truth of things as they are in themselves and that we 
can access that truth by taking up a distanced stance that is not rooted in 
a perspective. Identity challenges legal pedagogy because it makes one’s 
experiences epistemically important. 
Kimberle Crenshaw suggests a different way to interpret emotion and 
debate in the context of rape. In discussing the silencing and alienation of 
minority students in law school, she writes: 
In many instances, minority students’ values, beliefs, and experiences clash 
not only with those of their classmates but also with those of their professors. 
Yet because of the dominant view in academe that legal analysis can be taught 
without directly addressing conflicts of individual values, experiences, and 
world views, these conflicts seldom, if ever, reach the surface of the classroom 
discussion.30
It is more difficult to set aside personal values, experiences and world views in 
a discussion of the law when the topic is rape. In part this is because so many 
in the classroom will have personal experiences with it and will have analyzed 
it prior to law school. It will be more difficult for female students especially “to 
assume a stance that denies their own identity and requires them to adopt an 
apparently objective stance as the given starting point of analysis.”31
The passion associated with the crime of rape—which is so passionate 
in part because it is understood as a crime of power that is key to women’s 
29. catHarine mackinnon, toward a Feminist tHeorY oF tHe state 97 (1989).
30. Crenshaw, supra note 5, at 34-35.
31. Id. at 39.
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social subordination—directly challenges the epistemology that underpins 
traditional approaches to legal reasoning. A discussion of rape brings to the 
surface questions about objectivity and emotion that usually go unquestioned 
in legal discourse. In particular, female students’ emotions may very well 
challenge instructors’ distance and objectivity. Perhaps, then, the reluctance to 
teach rape law is connected to the fact that rape, more than other crimes and 
other issues encountered in law school, particularly in the first-year curriculum, 
forces instructors to confront the very notion of objectivity on which their craft 
is based. 
It is also crucial to note that, like rape, the dominant understanding of 
objectivity is bound up with power relations. Donna Haraway argues that 
the distanced view of objectivity “has been about a search for translation, 
convertibility, mobility of meanings, and universality—which I call 
reductionism, when one language (guess whose) must be enforced as the 
standard for all the translations and conversions.”32 The distanced, universal 
account of knowledge can act as a way of establishing and maintaining power. 
The silencing or eschewing of perspectives borne out of the experience of 
being rapable or being raped can be especially emotional insofar as it sustains 
oppression. 
Dismissing emotion as at odds with rational objective inquiry forestalls 
efforts to make emotion the beginning of a critical social theory.33 That is, to 
the extent the emotion of rape suggests the beginning of a social critique of 
gender and power, it is threatening to the established hierarchy. Dismissing 
emotion as inappropriate and irrational helps keep hierarchy in place in law 
schools. Furthermore, because gender is a salient feature of rape, it means 
that to understand the crime one must grapple with gender and social power. 
Although law school trains students to pick out the salient features of legal 
disputes, it does not equip students to grasp the underlying issues of power 
and social inequality that drive so many legal disputes. 
Notice, too, that placing the blame on students who are insufficiently 
objective and overly emotional insulates the law professor from interrogating 
his own subjectivity and the way in which he may undermine the importance 
of experience or set up an exclusionary power dynamic within the classroom. 
It may be that, as hooks argues, “[u]sually it is in a context where the 
experiential knowledge of students is being denied or negated that they 
may feel most determined to impress upon listeners both its value and its 
superiority to other ways of knowing.”34 Rape becomes an especially volatile 
subject in those classrooms in which there is a gendered dynamic that silences 
female voices and experience. 
32. Donna J. Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective, in simians, cYBorGs, and women: tHe reinvention oF nature 188, 187 (1991).
33. Alison M. Jaggar, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, 32 inquirY: an 
interdisciPlinarY Journal oF PHilosoPHY 151 (1989).
34. Hooks, supra note 7, at 88.
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These assessments of teaching rape law resonate with what Patricia Williams 
chronicles in The Alchemy of Race and Rights. She describes many instances in 
which her stands against racism and sexism in the legal academy are turned 
back against her to portray her as the wrongdoer. She gets in trouble for 
raising difficult questions that call on faculty and students to account for their 
perspectives and acknowledge their privilege. She is viewed as too personally 
invested in such issues to be objective.35 Students with “strong, sometimes 
irrational, often intemperate reactions” are likely to be implicitly or explicitly 
calling on faculty and other students to account for their perspective and 
examine their assumptions. 
It is worth noting that rape is not the only emotional subject that might be 
discussed in a criminal law course. In fact, I doubt there is any area of criminal 
law that is completely devoid of emotion. For example, is not homicide an 
emotional event? What sets rape apart is not just the intensity of emotions, but 
also the fact that rape is generally more personal and emotional for women. When 
instructors contemplate teaching rape law, they likely conjure up images of a 
classroom that is dominated by women’s emotions. Beneath the surface of the 
hesitancy to discuss rape law may well be the old trope of female hysteria: rape 
just cannot be discussed within the rational space of the law school classroom 
because women will just get too emotional, too hysterical even. 
At the same time, it is women’s emotional responses that will render their 
perspectives subjective, the product of their particular experience and thus not 
generalizable. Although all perspectives have some connection to experience, 
only those from dominant unmarked, unencumbered positions are coded as 
objective, especially in the rationalizing space of law school. Within the legal 
realm, apparently particular, local perspectives and their attendant emotions 
are thus easily dismissed. So long as personal investment in an issue is seen 
as polluting, distanced objectivity will be privileged. The subjectivity of 
the “expert” perspective will continue to be masked and presented as a true 
reflection of reality.36
Pedagogy and Epistemic Foundations
While the emotion associated with injured identity is challenging to the 
understandings of objectivity and rationality that dominate in law, when 
conjoined with an identity politics framework, emotion risks being seen as 
foundational. Just as the politics of identity can involve an uncritical appeal 
to experience, emotion also is often rendered as foundational, as something 
that serves as the ground of analysis but is not itself open to analysis.37 
35. Williams, supra note 17.
36. Martha L. Minow and Elizabeth V. Spelman have articulated a similar point in their 
exploration of law and the emotions: “There is a real risk of imposing one’s own perspective 
by claiming already to be impartial and objective—by claiming, indeed, to be the kind 
of reasonable person whose standards provide the standards for judging the conduct of 
others.” Minow & Spelman, supra note 4, at 52.
37. For a discussion of different “moments” in the relationship between feminist legal scholarship 
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Scholars both within and outside law are coming to understand emotions as 
themselves constructed. Just as I have urged an approach to experience that 
views experience as playing a role in establishing difference, rather than as the 
ground of difference, I urge a constructivist approach to the emotions.38 In 
fact, if both emotion and identity are understood as constructed, formed or 
developed in particular historical and cultural circumstances, the law school 
classroom emerges as a place where the production of gender and affect take 
place.39 Teaching rape law thus may be able to foster critical engagement with 
identity, emotion and the role of each in the study and practice of law.40
Both identity politics and the standard view of legal objectivity rely on 
an epistemology that does not call on those who claim to have knowledge 
to account for their perspectives. The standard view of legal epistemology 
relies on the view that there is one true version of reality and that the way 
to understand it is to be a distanced, neutral observer. As Crenshaw puts it: 
“Dominant beliefs in the objectivity of legal discourse serve to suppress the 
conflict by discounting the relevance of any particular perspective in legal 
analysis and by positing an analytical stance that has no specific cultural, 
political or class characteristics.”41 On this approach to knowledge, it is reality 
that determines knowledge and thus the knower’s perspective and position are 
irrelevant. In the identity politics framework, one’s experiences and identity 
are epistemically foundational, which precludes an inquiry into how identity 
and experience are formed. In both approaches, knowers are not accountable 
for their knowledge claims. Rather, it is either reality in itself or one’s identity 
that determines knowledge.42
A law school classroom that is dominated by either of these perspectives 
would be one that would silence some portion of the class. As I have argued, 
each approach has its drawbacks and liabilities when it comes to a conversation 
about rape. Identity politics is an important response to the privileging of 
a distanced, neutral approach to objectivity. In the case of legal objectivity, 
those who are too personally or emotionally invested in an issue would lack 
the ability to take a distanced, objective approach to the topic. However, 
in the context of rape, identity politics involves the privileging of women’s 
perspectives on rape in a way that can close off discussion of the production of 
and the emotions, see Abrams, supra note 4.
38. See, e.g., Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love, in tHe Passions 
oF law 217, (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); dan m. kaHan, tHe ProGressive aPProPriation 
oF disGust, in tHe Passions oF law, supra, at 63.
39. For an account of the gendering that takes place in law school, see, e.g., Guinier, Fine & Balin, 
supra note 5. 
40. For a discussion of identity and pedagogy, see Olympia Duhart, Improving Legal and Latino 
Education: Cluster Introduction—Education and Pedagogy—On Identity and Instruction, 48 cal. w. l. 
rev. 453 (2012).
41. Crenshaw, supra note 5, at 35.
42. Donna Haraway makes a similar critique of different ways of knowing. See Haraway, supra 
note 32, at 187.
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identity. Those without the presumed requisite experience of rape would lack 
the appropriate background and thus could be denied a voice. 
Identity politics simultaneously contains within it an important critique of 
legal reasoning and objectivity and is easily dismissed within the objective, 
rationalizing space of law school. As it plays out in the criminal law classroom, 
identity politics might close off discussion and also might be part of the 
motivation for not covering rape law at all. The notion that experience cannot 
be legitimately challenged because it is the basis from which one speaks leads 
to the worry that the classroom during a discussion of rape could become 
explosive. No better understanding of either the law of rape or experiences of 
rape can ever be reached if it is perceived to be too volatile an issue to discuss. 
Although the potential to replicate the problematic aspects of identity politics 
in a classroom discussion of rape, as well as instructors’ concerns about their 
own authority in the classroom may seem like legitimate reasons for not 
teaching rape law, I do not think the best response to the foregoing analysis 
is silence. 
Since the law school classroom is one place where future legal professionals, 
many of whom will have substantial power, form their ideas about rape, 
discussion is crucial. Precisely because people have such different and charged 
views of rape, it is important that future lawyers at least have the opportunity 
to discuss it. Furthermore, the reluctance to teach rape law and the politics of 
the pedagogy of rape law cannot be divorced from the historic tendency of 
prosecutors and judges to presume that women are the sole victims of sexual 
assault and in many instances trivialize rape accusations. Crenshaw argues, 
for example, that the reluctance of legal actors, including prosecutors, to 
address the rape of black women is rooted in stereotypes of black women’s 
licentiousness.43 The law school classroom could serve as a site where such 
stereotypes are confronted. 
A critical approach to the pedagogy of rape law would take the confrontation 
between different ways of understanding rape seriously and would be self-
reflective about knowledge and its production. I would call not just for 
getting more instructors to teach rape law—and for a related push to reveal 
that the decision not to teach rape law is just as political as the decision to 
do so—but also for an effort to reveal the space of the classroom, as well as 
the claims to knowledge made therein, as political.44 The difficulty will be 
in developing a pedagogy that allows for exploration of one’s position and 
an inquiry into how that affects one’s understanding of the crime of rape. 
Rather than taking the objective as that which has no point of view, it must be 
acknowledged that there is no way not to have a point of view. As Crenshaw 
notes, not calling “into question the objectivity of the dominant perspective . . . 
fail[s] to challenge majority students’ beliefs that the minority perspective 
is self-interested and biased, while the doctrinal framework and their own 
43. Crenshaw, supra note 5.
44. Teaching rape law in a way that differs from how other topics are taught may be an effective 
way to achieve this goal. For a possible alternative, see Bloch, supra note 1.
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perspectives are not.”45 The exploration of experience and identity can thus 
destabilize the appearance of legal objectivity and requires those with the 
dominant view to account for their perspective. As hooks explains: 
. . . a critique of essentialism that challenges only marginalized groups to 
interrogate their use of identity politics or an essentialist standpoint as a 
means to exerting coercive power leaves unquestioned the critical practices 
of other groups who employ the same strategies in different ways and whose 
exclusionary behavior may be firmly buttressed by institutionalized structures 
of domination that do not critique or check it.46
These critiques show that what is needed is an epistemology that would call 
for all to account for their perspectives—that is, an epistemology grounded in 
situated knowledges. Haraway writes:
. . . situated knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured 
as an actor and agent, not a screen or a ground or a resource, never finally 
as slave to the master that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and 
authorship of ‘objective’ knowledge. . . . Accounts of a ‘real’ world do not, 
then, depend on a logic of ‘discovery,’ but on a power-charged social relation 
of ‘conversation.’47
Such situated knowledges will always be partial, but it is possible to inquire 
into one’s perspective and partiality. Because the self is always partial and 
constructed, it is “therefore able to join with another, to see together without 
claiming to be another.”48 Haraway also notes that, although subjugated 
knowledges should be open to inquiry, they are the least likely to deny that 
knowledge emanates from a perspective. This is because those who are 
subjugated frequently confront partial knowledges that are held as universal 
and that conflict with their own knowledge. Taking subjugated knowledges 
seriously is thus most likely to lead to a world less defined by oppression.49
This is an epistemology that strives for justice. As Martha Minow and 
Elizabeth Spelman describe, “The ideal of justice includes an aspiration 
to try to step beyond personal predilections and prejudices; the adversary 
system seeks to challenge preconceptions by giving full play to competing 
perceptions.”50 She goes on to note of judges that, “these aspirations are for 
nought if the judge fails to challenge his or her own point of view and takes in 
all evidence and arguments without examining the tilt created by his or her own 
45. Crenshaw, supra note 5.
46. Hooks, supra note 7, at 82-83.
47. Haraway, supra note 32, at 198.
48. Id. at 193.
49. Id. at 191.
50. Minow & Spelman, supra note 4, at 52.
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angle of vision.”51 A similar dynamic occurs in law schools when instructors 
fail to examine their own perspective. Rape law is a difficult subject to teach 
in part because it is a topic that is more likely to raise questions, explicitly or 
implicitly, about the instructor’s point of view and the foundation of his or her 
authority. That is also precisely why it is so important a subject to teach. 
Conclusion: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of Rape Law
My arguments in this article serve as a call for rethinking, not just the 
teaching of rape law in particular, but legal education and its norms more 
generally. Many of the traditional norms of legal education rely on the idea 
critiqued in this article that distanced dispassionate reasoning is necessary 
to arrive at legal truth. This call for an exploration of critical approaches to 
the pedagogy of rape law fits within a substantial tradition of questioning 
the norms of legal education and the way in which it alienates those on the 
margins and sidelines their concerns.52
Acknowledging the many reasons that rape law is a difficult subject to teach 
is the first step toward addressing those difficulties. Rather than pushing an 
important issue out of the curriculum because it is not easy to teach, attention 
should be focused on how to handle the subject well. This likely will involve 
pedagogical experiments. Perhaps my own professor’s tactic of small group 
discussions—though ceding before teaching of the topic ever begins that it 
is a different and more emotional subject—is a way to keep the topic in the 
curriculum and acknowledge its particular politics. Advancing a pedagogy 
that does not silence experience but instead uses it as a means of exploring 
the differences within a classroom and the way in which those differences are 
established would lessen hostility and exclusion. 
One problem with the training received in law schools is that it can give 
too much importance to legal reforms and present them as key to social 
transformation. A potential pitfall of integrating the study of rape law into 
criminal law courses is that it could reinforce the propensity to view litigiousness 
as fundamental to solving social problems. Sharon Marcus argues that the way 
out of what she calls the “rape script”—the social script that casts women as 
powerless victims and men as powerful perpetrators—is to focus on combating 
rape before injury occurs. Anti-rape efforts focus too much on the law and the 
redressing of injury in a way that identifies women as inherently rapable. She 
calls for a politics of rape prevention that would aim to provide women with 
tools for combating rape instead of just accepting women’s rapability and thus 
seeking only redress.53
51. Id. at 52.
52. Scholars who have made this argument include: Crenshaw, supra note 5; Greenberg, supra 
note 5; Guinier, Fine & Balin, supra note 5; Homer & Schwartz, supra note 5; Weiss & Melling, 
supra note 5.
53. sHaron marcus, FiGHtinG Bodies, FiGHtinG words, in Feminists tHeorize tHe Political 
385 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992).
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Litigiousness can in fact reinforce and be an effect of identity politics. 
Brown argues that the politics of injured identity is the basis “for litigiousness 
as a way of political life.”54 In seeking legal remedies, injury is redressed, not 
challenged or combated. A sole focus on criminal law remedies does not 
challenge the idea that women’s injured identity is foundational. A critical 
pedagogy of rape law might, then, include an exploration of alternatives 
to law. Perhaps an exploration of the injury paradigm could be part of the 
conversation. The law school classroom could be a place where discussions of 
rape prevention and how to contest the notion of women’s inherent rapability 
could occur. 
I am not so optimistic as to think that every criminal law instructor will 
teach the topic of rape well or with sufficient sensitivity. It is probably the case 
that most instructors do not want to use rape law to explore issues of identity, 
emotion and objectivity. And many will never question their own perspective. 
Nonetheless, I hold out hope that in some instances the law school classroom 
could be an important site for conversations in which students and instructors 
come to appreciate the partiality of their own perspectives. Although rape 
certainly is a challenging topic to teach for a variety of reasons, instructors 
who leave it untaught and undiscussed fail to use the classroom to challenge 
and broaden their own and their students’ understandings of a serious and 
pervasive crime.
54. Brown, supra note 4, at xii.
